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Abstract  This paper empirically examines the relationship between firm value and the usage of currency derivatives for 85 non-financial Swedish firms listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange. The sample includes firms operating in a wide range of industries and with different sizes. The time period for the data is from 2005 to 2010. There is no proof of an existing relationship between currency derivative 
usage and firm value. The most significant result indicates that a negative correlation 
between leverage and firm value exists.  
Keywords: risk management, firm value, Tobin’s Q, currency derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, FX risk  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background of the study  
The increased pace of globalization compels internationally-oriented companies to 
engage in hedging activities to protect themselves against financial perils, such as 
foreign exchange, commodity and interest rate risks. Financial derivatives, for 
example, are a mechanism that firms can utilize to hedge their exposure to such risks 
and guard their cash flows against financial market uncertainties. Various theories 
state that enterprises can manage risk by other means. This research, however, refers 
to hedging as using financial derivatives, unless stated differently.  
Derivatives, which are merely agreements between two or more parties, derive their 
value from underlying asset, such as a currency, commodity or interest rate. Using 
derivatives as a mode of risk management usually requires an initial investment to 
mitigate unwanted future price movements. In addition to their applicability as a 
hedging instrument, companies might also use them for speculative reasons. 
 
Numerous theories found empirical evidence on the hedging premium, which implies 
a positive correlation between hedging and firm value. Additionally, previous studies 
indicate that hedging helps to mitigate the underinvestment problem, agency cost and 
reduce corporate taxes (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Stultz 1984; Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1993). Firms can hedge in several ways, for example by using options such as 
futures, forwards and swaps but also by operational and accounting strategies and by 
issuing foreign debt in order to hedge foreign currency exposure (Allayanis and Ofek, 
1997; Petersen and Thiagarajan, 2000). 
There are many studies done on the relationship between hedging and firm value, for 
example Jin and Jorion (2006) investigated the correlation between firm value and oil 
hedging for US oil and gas producers between 1998-2001. Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) examined the FX derivative usage and its direct impact on firm value for US 
firms from 1990 to 1995. Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) explored commodity 
hedging and firm value in the U.S airline industry. Jankensgård (2015) studied a 
sample of Swedish firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in the end of 2009. 
He examined whether centralized vs. decentralized decision making impacts firm 
value.  
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1.2. Research objectives  
The purpose of this study is to examine if there exists a difference in firm value 
between users and non-users of FX derivatives. Firm value is explained by Tobin’s Q 
and is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by the replacement 
cost of its assets, evaluated at the end of each fiscal year. This study is based on firms 
listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange for the six-year period between 2005-2010. I 
explore if hedging against FX risk has an impact on firm value, while controlling for 
factors such as size, profitability, leverage, dividend payouts, diversified product 
segments and capital expenditures.   
As far as my knowledge goes there has not up to this date been a study that 
investigates the direct relationship between firm value and FX derivative usage made 
on a sample of Swedish listed firms with a longer time period that experiences a 
financial crisis. The Swedish market is known to be open, which also means that 
Swedish firms are more exposed to FX risks than for instance firms from the US. This 
is because many Swedish firms have operations abroad and are exposed to exchange 
rate movements through foreign sales and export/import activities. This study 
provides no clear evidence that hedging is correlated with firm value in either 
direction. The most significant result is the negative correlation between leverage and 
firm value. 
1.3. Outline  
This paper is segmented into six sections. Section 2 summarizes previous research on 
hedging and firm value. Section 3 includes the discussion and background and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 4 elaborates the methodology and sample data. 
Section 5 includes the empirical result and analysis. Section 6 concludes the study.  
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2. Prior research on hedging and firm value 
2.1. Overview  
Hedging should not be relevant to firm value in a perfect capital market (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1958). Theory, however, recognizes several market imperfections that can 
make risk management beneficial, thus contradicting the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) theorem. These imperfections, which will be further discussed in the context of 
previous research and include; the underinvestment problem, the cost of financial 
distress and costly external financing (Carter et al., 2006; Froot et al., 1993; Geczy et 
al., 1997), managerial risk aversion (Guay and Kothari, 2002; Mian, 1996; Stulz, 
1984; Smith; Stulz, 1985) tax incentives (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 
1985; Stulz, 1996; Leland, 1998). Most importantly, this section will examine the 
direct relationship between hedging and firm value. 
2.2. The underinvestment problem  
Several theories suggest that derivative usage can reduce the underinvestment 
problem (Carter et al., 2006; Geczy et al., 1997; Froot et al., 1993; Gay and Nam, 
1998; Hagelin, 2003). The problem of underinvestment occurs when external 
financing is expensive and internal capital is insufficient to finance growth 
opportunities. (Ogden, Jen and O’Connor, 2003). Froot et al. (1993) argues that 
hedging could reduce the underinvestment problem to firms with growth opportunities 
when external financing is more costly than internal funds. They discovered that cash 
flows generated within the firm could be disrupted by external factors such as volatile 
market prices. The hedging firm can increase value even though the market is volatile 
by ensuring that it has sufficient cash flows available to take on value-enhancing 
projects. Gay and Nam (1998) directly analyzed the underinvestment problem as a 
factor of derivative usage. They argue that risk management is beneficial as it 
decreases the cost of external financing in poor economic climates, hence reducing the 
underinvestment problem. Carter et al. (2006) examines whether jet fuel hedging is 
positively related to firm value in the airline industry. They test a sample of 259 U.S. 
airlines and find that hedgers trade at a premium of about 14%; moreover, they 
suggest that hedging is important as it allows firms to expand operations during 
unstable times, thereby alleviating the underinvestment problem. Hagelin (2003) 
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examined a sample of firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange together with 
their hedging policies. He finds evidence that firms hedge with the aim of reducing 
their FX exposure. Consequently, this decreases the expected costs of financial 
distress by lowering the cost of external financing, which will minimize the 
underinvestment problem during poor economic times. Likewise, Geczy et al. (1997) 
examines FX derivative activities and demonstrates that currency derivative usage is 
related to research and development expenditures, which is also consistent with the 
theory that hedging reduces the underinvestment problem. Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993) corroborate this theory by proving that hedgers have higher R&D 
expenditures. Furthermore, they provide evidence that hedgers have less fixed claims, 
are larger and have more growth opportunities. 
 
However, there are contradictory studies that show no evidence of a relationship 
between hedging and underinvestment. Some studies, such as Mian (1996) even 
reveal a negative correlation between a firm’s derivative usage and its investment 
opportunities. Likewise, Berkman and Bradbury examine a sample of New Zealand 
firms and find little evidence to support the underinvestment hypothesis. In New 
Zealand firms are required to report the fair and notional value of their off- and on 
balance sheet derivatives. Berkman and Bradbury, thus, have access to accurate data, 
which gives them a more precise outcome compared to studies where information is 
gathered using surveys. Several studies show no relation between hedging and firm 
value, which supports the evidence of hedging not reducing the underinvestment 
problem. 
2.3. Managerial risk aversion 
 
There are several contradicting theories concerning managerial risk aversion. One 
theory typology suggests that managers hedge because of the incentive to maximize 
their own utility. Guay and Kothari (2002) argue that a risk averse manager, one 
keeps most of his wealth within the firm, will most likely attempt to reduce the firms’ 
risk by hedging. This will reduce the required risk premium, which means that 
stakeholders will receive a smaller return on their investments. 
 
Risk-averse managers engage in hedging for their own benefit if their wealth is 
concentrated in the firm and if the cost of independently hedging for their own benefit 
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exceeds the cost of hedging at the firm level (Stulz 1984; Smith and Stulz 1985). 
Managers are responsible to choose a firm’s hedging policy. Even though it is 
believed that managers will pick a hedging policy that maximizes their own utility, 
Stulz (1984) argues that shareholders will in the end select managers that will 
maximize shareholder wealth, hence maximizing firm value. Smith and Stulz (1985) 
argue that hedging should increase firm value, as long as the cost of hedging is less 
than the reduction in managers’ compensation plus the increased revenues gained 
through hedging. 
 
Jin and Jorion (2007) studied the effect of hedging activities on gold mining firms and 
found strong indication that supports the managerial risk aversion theory. They 
suggests that managers who hold more stock tend to undertake more hedging 
activities, while managers that hold more options tend to be less involved in hedging. 
This is also supported by Graham and Rogers (2002), who imply that derivative usage 
is related to a manager’s equity position. Tufano (1996) examined hedging activities 
in the gold-mining industry and found that the use of commodity derivatives is 
positively related to the value of stock that is held by managers and directors. This 
implies that managers’ who have their own wealth within the company believe that 
derivative usage affects firm value positively. They are more engaged in managing 
risk because their own wealth is directly affected by their actions at the firm level. 
This is also consistent with theories of managerial risk aversion done by Stulz (1984). 
Jin & Jorion (2006) found no evidence that hedging leads to higher firm value, but 
suggest that if hedging has no impact on firm value, then the management uses 
hedging activities for personal utility maximization purposes. 
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2.4. Tax incentives 
 
Several theories suggest that derivative usage may be motivated by tax incentives. 
First, firms can reduce the expected cost of tax liability if the tax function is convex 
(Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985). A convex tax function implies that 
the effective tax rate increases together with the pre-tax income. Second, firms can 
hedge to expand their debt capacity, which will increase interest tax deductions and 
lead to greater tax advantages (Leland 1998). Nance et al. (1993) implied that hedging 
will reduce financial distress costs and reduce expected taxes. Smith and Stulz (1985) 
argue that tax volatility is costly for firms with a convex effective tax rate. Thus firms 
will undertake hedging activities which minimizes tax related costs by reducing pre-
tax income volatility. They imply that the structure of the tax code can make it 
advantageous for firms to take positions in futures, forward and option markets, if the 
effective marginal tax rates are an increasing function of the firm’s pre-tax income. If 
hedging reduces the variability of the pre-tax value, then the expected corporate tax 
liability is reduced and the expected post tax value of the firm is increased, as long as 
the cost of hedging does not exceed this value.  
 
Graham and Rogers (2002) directly measure the tax function convexity and determine 
tax savings that can be achieved by reducing the volatility of the taxable income. They 
do this by studying derivative usage in 1994-1995 on a sample of 442 firms and find 
no evidence that firms engage in hedging activities in order to reduce the expected tax 
liability by decreasing the volatility of the taxable income. Their study shows that 
there is no evidence implying a positive relationship between derivative usage and tax 
convexity. Graham et al. (2002), Leland (1998) and Stulz (1996) illustrate that 
hedging increases debt capacity by minimizing the volatility of income and reducing 
the probability of financial distress.  
 
2.5. Direct relationship between firm value and hedging 
Clark and Mefteh (2010) examine the direct relationship between FX derivatives 
usage and firm value for 240 of the largest French non-financial firms in 2004. They 
find evidence implying that derivative usage significantly adds value to French firms, 
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but that this effect mainly applies to larger firms.  However, the limitation of this 
study is that seasonal effects might influence their results as they only use cross-
sectional data. Similarly, Allayannis and Weston (2001) examined the relationship 
between firm value and the usage of foreign currency derivatives on 270 large non-
financial firms. They use panel data, with a time period of 5 years (1990-1995), which 
gives a more accurate result as the longer time period accounts for seasonal effects. 
They find that the firm market value of foreign currency derivative users is about 5% 
higher compared to non-users, which is almost $200 million of added value to 
hedging firms. However, they argue that companies that enjoy high growth 
opportunities tend to have higher firm value, and therefore have bigger incentives to 
hedge. They tested for reverse causation and found no evidence that enterprises 
merely based on their large firm value choose to hedge, and that firms with lower firm 
value would chose to stay un-hedged. They found evidence that companies that begin 
to use derivatives experience increased firm value compared to firms that choose to 
remain un-hedged. Likewise, firms that quit hedging experience decreased firm value 
compared to firms that remain hedged. 
Jankensgård (2015) studied a sample of 257 Swedish firms that were listed on 
Stockholm Stock Exchange in the end of 2009. Because of the data scarcity on 
centralization /decentralization, his research is limited to cross-section data. This can 
give biased results due to seasonal cycles and macroeconomic effects. Jankensgård 
showed that derivative usage is value adding to firms with a centralized foreign 
exchange exposure management, while firms with a decentralized approach showed 
no evidence of FX derivative premium. He called this the “centralized premium” and 
argued that firms with a decentralized risk management suffer from coordination 
problems and cost inefficiencies.  
In contrast to Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Clark and Mefteh, (2010), Jin & 
Jorion (2006), finds no support that hedging leads to higher firm value. They 
investigate the hedging activities of a sample of 119 U.S oil and gas producers from 
1998 to 2001 and conclude that hedging reduces stock price sensitivity to oil and gas 
prices. However, they found no evidence that there is a variance in firm values 
between hedgers and non-hedgers. They also argue that the hedging premium is 
associated with the types of risks a company is exposed to. However, they claim that 
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if hedging does not impact firm value, then management uses hedging for personal 
utility maximization. 
 
Likewise, Hentschel and Kothari (1997) argue that numerous firms actively manage 
their foreign exposure with derivative usage. But, when comparing hedgers to non-
hedgers, they barely show any differences in their risk characteristics that can be 
linked to derivative usage. Tufano (1996) examined hedging activities in the gold-
mining industry and state that more than 85% of all gold mining firms engaged in 
some sort of gold price hedging in 1990-1993. Nevertheless, he finds little empirical 
support that risk management increases firm value. Jin and Jorion (2007) contributed 
with an additional study on the relation between hedging activities and gold mining 
firms. They found no evidence that derivatives would have a positive impact on firm 
value.   
Adam and Fernando (2006) examined gold mining firms in the period 1900-2000 and 
found that companies that engage in hedging experience an economically significant 
increase in cash flows. They have a considerable longer time period compared to 
other studies, which should reduce seasonal and macroeconomic effects and provide 
unbiased results. They claim that forward prices are usually higher than spot prices, 
which will allow firms to sell at a forward price that is on average higher than the spot 
price, earning on typically a premium of 3%.
 
However, there is no evidence that this 
contributes to higher firm value.   
Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) provide a different and very detailed case study 
made on two gold mining firms, whereas one of them uses derivatives and the other 
one does not. They find no premium for the user of derivatives and conclude that the 
equity exposure to gold prices is almost the same for the two firms. However, they 
claim that risk management can be done in other ways besides using derivatives. They 
imply that the firm that does not use derivatives manages its risk through operational 
and accounting strategies, which can be a reason to why they do not find any 
differences in firm value. These studies are made on firms operating in specific 
industries; hence the outcomes of their research can highly be affected by industry-
specific factors. 
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1. Background 
 
According to the classic Modigliani and Miller paradigm; risk management is 
irrelevant, assuming that firms operate in a frictionless capital market. They argue that 
investors are rational and can protect themselves by keeping a well-diversified 
portfolio, but also that they are able to reduce risk by themselves at the same cost 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, we do not live in a perfect world and recent 
studies show that in the presence of capital market imperfections, such as agency 
costs, costs of external financing, information asymmetries, direct and indirect 
bankruptcy costs, as well as taxes, corporate hedging will add value to shareholders 
(Bartram & Dufey, 2007; Gay and Nam, 1998; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Hagelin, 
2003; Judge, 2003; Mian, 2006; Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
 
Several empirical studies provide evidence on reasons to why firms participate in 
hedging activities. Carter et al. (2006), Gay and Nam (1998) and Hagelin (2003) 
argue that risk management is relevant to firms because it will alleviate the 
underinvestment problem in bad economic times as it reduces the cost of external 
financing. They show that there is a positive relationship between hedging and growth 
opportunities. Similarly, Nance et al. (1993) and Geczy et al. (1997) examined 
hedging activities and found that hedging is positively related to growth opportunities. 
 
There are different interpretations on the value maximization theory. Numerous 
studies found empirical evidence that corporate hedging has no impact on firm value, 
as investors can by themselves reduce risk at least as efficiently through 
diversification. Managing risk that investors cannot diversify away by themselves 
may not increase shareholder value because investors receive a premium return for 
holding risky securities (Hentschel and Kothari, 1997; Jin and Jorion, 2006; Jin and 
Jorion 2007; Tufano, 1996). Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983) argue that hedging market 
risk is a trade-off between risk and reward in the market.   
Jin and Jorion (2007) and Tufano (1996) studied the effect of hedging activities on 
gold mining firms and could not find evidence that hedging positively impacts firm 
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values. As mentioned previously, Jin & Jorion (2006) tested for a difference in firm 
value between firms that hedge and those that do not hedge their oil and gas price risk. 
Their findings indicate that there is generally no difference in firm value between 
hedging and non-hedging companies. These studies are contrary to the findings 
reported in Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Carter et al. (2006).  
As we know, a frictionless market only exists in order to support and develop 
theories, and corporate hedging can according to several empirical studies enhance 
shareholder’s value through its impact on agency costs, costly external financing, 
direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy, as well as taxes (Jankensgard, 2015). 
According to theory, risk management can create value by reducing various forms of 
financial distress costs such as costs of bankruptcy or alleviating underinvestment 
problems by decreasing cash flow volatility (Bartram and Dufey 2007; Smith and 
Stulz 1985).  
3.2. Discussion and delimitations 
 
Several theories have been developed on the derivative premium and the numerous 
factors that might impact firm value. A limitation to this study is that some of the 
explanatory variables that are not included in the research possibly impact firm value 
and the decision to hedge. Some of these variables are not observable, or have been 
excluded due to the data and time constraints. To allow for a better analysis, some of 
the omitted variables will be deliberated; a managers’ own stake in the company, 
foreign sales, a manager’s quality, the faced risk exposure, industry-specific factors, 
the aim of hedging and whether the firm has a centralized or decentralized approach 
to risk management. Foreign sales or other international activities are important 
factors to why firms chose to hedge against currency fluctuations. Figures on foreign 
sales were obtained from Datastream, but was excluded due to huge data 
inconsistency. Jankensgård (2015) finds that firms with a centralized approach to risk 
management experience a derivative premium while firms with a decentralized 
approach do not show an increase in firm value associated wiith derivative usage. 
Managerial quality is rather an unobservable firm characteristic and is difficult to 
measure. Additionally, my econometric model is bound to several limitations and 
provides evidence of robustness. 
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Studies illustrate mixed empirical results regarding the hedging premium, but most of 
these analyses were based on data before the financial crisis in 2007-2008. Therefore 
they do not examine change in firm value that experienced a severe financial crisis. 
The hedging premium of hedging firms should – according to some theories – have a 
lower financial distress cost during poor economic times (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Consequently, the difference in firm value between hedgers and non-hedgers should 
be even greater during this volatile period. After reading numerous articles, I observed 
that most studies have a relative short time period; in most cases the time period 
varies between 1-3 years. Therefore, I use panel data with a time period of 6 years, 
which should be sufficient to get appropriate results and account for seasonal effects.   
Another important factor is whether companies hedge with the aim of protecting 
themselves from market uncertainties or for speculative reasons. There are several 
studies indicating that firm’s hedge for other reasons that managing risk (Mian, 1996; 
Nance et al., 1993; Tufano, 1996; Geczy et al., 1997). It is vital to mention that 
Allayannis and Ofek (1997) examined whether firms hedge to reduce foreign 
exchange risk or for speculative purposes and discovered that firms use derivatives to 
reduce their risk exposure, and not to speculate. This indicates that the purpose of 
derivative usage is to manage risk and is part of a value-increasing strategy. 
Additionally, they found a positive relationship between foreign sales and the decision 
of a firm to issue foreign debt. This suggests that companies can by issuing foreign 
debt manage foreign exchange instability. This can affect my results as we are only 
examining how derivative usage impact firm value. The fact that firms may hedge for 
speculative reasons and that can firms are able manage risk in other ways than by 
using derivatives is disregarded. This is supported by Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) 
who claim that firms are able to decrease their risk exposure through operational and 
accounting choices. 
An additional problem is the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables. For example, Froot et al. (1993) pointed out that the more 
valuable the firm’s investment opportunities, the more attractive risk management 
becomes because disruptions to the investment program are more costly, this leads to 
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the endogeneity problem, that is the independent variable is correlated with the error 
term. It is possible to test for this possibility by running the Hausman test. 
3.3. Hypothesis   
The purpose of this research is to examine if there exists a relationship between firm 
value and the usage of FX derivatives. Due to the mixed results on the derivative 
premium in previous studies, I want to study the relationship between FX derivatives 
and firm value. A large number of Swedish firms have operations abroad, hence are 
exposed to foreign exchange risk. This fact makes is suitable to study Swedish 
companies. The time period is from 2005 to 2010, where the economy witnessed one 
of the most severe financial crises in history, which could have an affect on the 
results.  
 
Due to the facts mention in the background and discussion and given that we are 
living in an uncertain financial world, I aim to test if hedging impacts firm value. 
Hedging does not only serve as a measure against instability but it also sends signals 
to investors that the firms’ future cash flows are secured and that the risk of financial 
distress is reduced.  
 
The hypothesis is the following: 
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4. Methodology 
4.1. Overview  
The focus of my research lays on a sample of Swedish firms that are listed on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange. The aim is to examine if the usage of foreign currency 
derivatives impacts firm value. To my research I have used numerous empirical 
studies based on similar topics, but would point out Jankensgård (2015) and 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) as the main benchmarks. Both studies provide 
exceptional analyses and examine the relation between FX derivative usage and firm 
value. Jankensgård research is important because his sample collection is based on 
Swedish firms. He studies the impact of centralized vs. decentralized risk 
management, but has the limitation of only using cross-sectional data. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics  
The choice of sample selection is very critical to the accuracy of the results. The 
sample selection is narrowed down to Swedish firms with different size that are 
operating in different industries. Second, firms operating in different industries and 
with different growth rates can make the comparison biased since firm value can be 
affected by industry-specific variables not included in our analysis. But, as my focus 
is country-specific, I chose to study a wide range of industries in order to measure the 
overall effect of hedging. The choice of currency derivatives is due to the fact that 
they are one of the most frequently used derivatives and I want to examine how their 
usage affects firm value. 
 
This study is conducted on 85 Swedish firms that were listed on the large, mid, and 
small cap lists on the Stockholm stock exchange from 2005 to 2010, totaling (85 
firms*6 years) 520 observations. As we know, 2007-2008 experienced a severe 
financial crisis. This is a relevant time period to test the hedging premium, because if 
it exists, hedging firms will reduce the financial distress cost during poor periods and 
consequently show an even greater difference in firm value than non-hedging firms 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985). Froot et al. (1993) and Gay and Nam (1998) found that 
hedging firms could increase firm value in the case of market volatility, because 
hedging will reduce the underinvestment problem when external financing is costly.  
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The reason I study firms from Sweden is because the country is largely dependent on 
export, has an open economy and a well-integrated financial market. Nevertheless, 
Sweden has not been studied thoroughly in previous researches and is a country that 
has managed to cope with the financial crisis better than many other economies. 
 
We have included firms that operate in different industries and with different sizes; 
hence the study includes companies that are listed as small, mid and large cap. All the 
financial service firms were excluded, because most of them are market makers in 
foreign currencies derivatives, thus their motivations for using derivatives may differ 
from the motivations of nonfinancial firms. I also excluded public organizations 
because they are heavily regulated. After excluding these, I was left with 353 firms 
that were extracted from Datastream. Many of them lacked data for the whole sample 
period and had to be omitted. There was also evidence of the financial crisis during 
200-2008 as many firms were being unlisted in this period. Due to incomplete data 
and missing relevant information both in Datastream and the annual reports; left were 
only 85 companies to include in the research. As many as 66 (78%) of them are 
currency derivative users while only 19 (22%) do not use FX derivatives. As noted, 
the proportion of derivative users is much higher, which can be expected in an open 
economy where firms in one way or another deal with foreign currencies. 
4.2.1. Firm value 
 
Tobin’s Q is used as a measure of a firm’s market value. Tobin’s Q is defined as the 
ratio of the market value of the firm to replacement cost of assets, evaluated at the end 
of the fiscal year. We compute Tobin’s Q for a total of 85 firm-year observations 
(Total 85 firms*6 years). The natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q was calculated as it can 
account for skewed distribution. Tobin’s Q has been used as a firm value measure in 
numerous previous researches which also makes it suitable to include in my research, 
as it can serve as a benchmark when comparing my results to other studies. 
Additionally, all the data needed to calculate Tobin’s Q is obtainable from 
Datastream. 
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4.2.2. Derivative usage  
Information on whether firms use currency derivatives is found in their annual reports, 
which requires manually going through each individual statement. In some cases, this 
information was easy to obtain as some companies have transparent risk management 
programs and are also clear about why they use derivatives. Several enterprises stated 
that the purpose of hedging is not for speculative activities but rather to minimize the 
volatility of future cash flows and exposure to currency exchange rates. Others are not 
as transparent and required careful analysis of their annual reports. In this study, the 
usage of FX derivatives is a dummy variable that will take on the value of  “1” for 
users and “0” otherwise. 
4.2.3. Other determinants of firm value  
Similar to Jankensgårds (2015) research, the control variables included in this study 
are: dividends, firm size, profitability, leverage, diversification and capital 
expenditures. As mentioned, the aim was to use foreign sales as a control variable, but 
due to the severe lack of relevant data, this variable had to be excluded. Table 1 
summarizes the sample construction. 
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Table 1: Summary of variables and data sources 
 
 
 
Variables Definition Source 
Tobin’s Q Log(Total book value of assets less book 
value of equity plus market value of 
equity)/Total Assets 
Datastream 
Hedging A dummy variable that takes on the value of 
1 if the firm hedges and 0 otherwise 
Annual reports 
Leverage Total debt/Total assets Datastream 
CAPEX Additions to Fixed Assets/Total sales Datastream 
Profitability Net income/Total assets Datastream 
Firm size Logarithm of total assets Datastream 
Dividend A dummy variable that takes on the value of 
1 if firm pays dividend and 0 otherwise 
Datastream 
Diversified A dummy variable that takes value 1 if firms 
have more than 2 product segments and 0 
otherwise 
Annual Reports 
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4.3. Statistical distributions for diagnostic tests  
In order to run an OLS regression that will provide as accurate results as possible, it is 
necessary to run various regression diagnostic tests. To obtain an unbiased OLS, there 
are four desirable properties that should be satisfied: 
 
(1) E(ut ) = 0 
(2) Var(ut)= σ 2 < ∞  
(3) cov(ui , u j ) = 0  
(4) cov(ut , xt ) = 0  
 
The first assumption (1) requires that the average value of the errors is zero. To solve 
this, when estimating the OLS regression we include a constant term is included in the 
equation to avoid violation of this assumption. 
 
For the second assumption (2), it is assumed that the variance of the errors is constant 
and finite over all values of xt. This is known as the assumption of homoscedasticity. 
If the errors do not have a constant variance, they are said to be heteroscedastic. The 
consequence of not having a constant variance is that the OLS estimation will be 
biased. 
 
Assumption (3) requires that the covariance between the error terms over time is zero, 
which implies that errors are linearly independent of one another. The Watson Durbin 
statistics can expose this problem. 
 
Assumption (4) requires that there is no relationship between the error term and the 
corresponding xt values.  
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4.4. Model development  
Panel data is used as multiple companies together with their characteristics over a 
time period of 6 years are being analyzed; consequently we have both time series and 
cross-section data. The data has been organized according to panel data in Excel and 
was then extracted to the software program EViews. 
 
As I aim to examine is hedging is associated with firm value, we use Tobin’s Q as the 
dependent variable. In my initial model, Tobin’s Q is on the left side of the equation 
in and the explanatory variables are on the right side. To test for the hedging premium 
I used an OLS model that is based on the following equation:  
 
Log(Tobin’s Q) =   * +   *hedging +   *leverage 
+   *CAPEX +   *profitability +   *size 
+   *dividend +  *diversified 
 
Because firm value is affected by several variables, I use a multivariate test where I 
am able to control for other variables besides hedging. I test whether derivative usage 
has an impact on firm value and control for size, profitability, leverage, capital 
expenditures, diversification and dividend payouts. 
4.4.1. Hypothesis testing  
The first regression was made with the random effects specification. In order to 
evaluate if there exists a significant difference in the estimates of the two models, I 
employed the Hausman test. Giving a probability of 0.000, it implies that the fixed 
effect for both time-series and cross-section is a more appropriate model to use on my 
data. However, two of the dummy variables take on the same value through the whole 
sample period for a given firm, that is for example when a given firm hedges 
throughout the whole 6-year period. This is problematic because it is not possible to 
run the fixed cross-section effects when including these dummy variables in the 
regression. The fixed effects model assigns a unique intercept to each individual firm 
and is useful because it controls for unobservable firm characteristics that may affect a 
firm value (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). Given the unique intercept, fixed effects can 
(1)
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control for individual firm specific effects. The regression for fixed cross-section 
effect is done without the dummy variables in order to compare the other variables 
with the pooled and random regression. Running a regression without these dummies 
means that hedging is excluded, which is the main aspect of this thesis. However, it 
should serve as a comparable regression of the other variables. 
 
Excluding the dummy variables “hedge”, “diversified” and “dividend”: 
Log(Tobin’s Q) =    +   *leverage  
+   *CAPEX +   *profitability +   *size 
 
I added back dividend, as it is the only dummy variable that does not take on the same 
value throughout the whole sample period for an individual firm: 
 
Log(Tobin’s Q) =    +   *leverage +   *CAPEX 
+   *profitability +   *size +   *dividend  
 
Afterwards, I ran the pooled regression with all variables included: 
 
Log(Tobin’s Q) =    +   *hedging +   *leverage 
+   *CAPEX +   *profitability +   *size  
+   *dividend +  *diversified 
 
To check for robustness, I additionally complemented with testing several models and 
ran the pooled regression, fixed time-series effects and the cross-section random 
effects test equation. Running different models permits me to compare the results of 
multiple regressions, which results in a more comprehensive analysis. Additionally, I 
ran two separate regressions with fixed effects, one made only on hedgers and the 
other one on non-hedgers.  
(3) 
(4)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(2)
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5. Analysis 
5.1. Firm value 
 
The regression output shows no evidence that hedging would impact firm value in any 
of the tested models. Interpreting    in the pooled and the fixed period effects 
regression; around 13% vs. 22% of firm value is explain by the independent variables. 
This indicates that the rest is explained by external factors not included in this 
research. This is also supported by the Durbin Watson statistics for both regressions, 
which suggest that there exists a positive serial correlation in the residuals. Omitting 
variables in the model can be the main cause of autocorrelation, because an 
explanatory variable is excluded, its effect on the regressand instead becomes a part of 
the residuals. Consequently, if the excluded regressor is positively related to the 
dependent variable, it can lead to positively correlated residuals. One example of an 
omitted variable could be managers quality, which logically suggest that the better the 
manager, the higher the firm value. In previous sections, additional explanatory 
variables are described that most likely will impact firm value but are not included in 
this research. It is evident that we are not able to draw a robust conclusion due to 
variations in the regression results. 
 
When running the fixed effects model and excluding all the dummy variables, the    
suggested that roughly 80% of firm value is explain by the independent variables. 
This implies that dividend, diversification and hedging should not have any 
noteworthy effects on firm value. 
 
As noted, the empirical evidence indicates that there is no significant difference in 
firm value between hedgers and non-hedgers, in contrast to what Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) found. However, Guay and Kothari (2003) question their findings and 
suggest that derivative usage will not increase firm value under extreme market 
instability. This supports my research as data have been collected from a time period 
that experienced a financial crisis. This is also backed by Jin & Jorion (2006) who 
studied oil hedging and its impact on firm value. They do not find any significant 
differences between hedgers and non-hedgers. Similarly, Jin and Jorion (2007) could 
not find any positive relationship between firm value and derivative usage in their 
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study based on North American gold mining firms. Copeland and Joshi (1996) and 
Hagelin and Prambourg (2004) also imply that hedging might be ineffective when it 
comes to reducing risk. However, their findings may be affected by industry-specific 
factors. 
5.2. Leverage   
Comparing the different regression results in table 2, the independent variable 
LEVERAGE appears to have the most significant influence on firm value, implying a 
negative relationship between leverage and firm value. This is contradictory to 
evidence found by Clark and Mefteh (2010) who argues that leverage is not a 
significant explanatory variable of firm value. Table 3 shows that hedgers tend to 
employ higher levels of leverage. Moreover, it also demonstrates that hedgers on 
average have lower firm values than non-hedgers. This can support the regression 
results of negative correlation between leverage and firm value, as it shows that 
hedgers who employ more leverage have a lower firm value. This is consistent with 
the research done by Aggarwal and Zhao (2007) who also reports a constant negative 
relationship between leverage and firm value. This is also in line with theories 
indicating that firm’s hedge with the purpose of increasing their debt capacity. Higher 
leverage leads to greater tax advantages as it increases the interest tax deductions 
(Leland 1998).  
5.3. Profitability  
There are significant outcomes for PROFITABILITY but with mixed results 
regarding its impact on firm value. Model 2 shows a negative relationship between 
profitability and firm value while the pooled and fixed period effects imply a positive 
correlation, which one would expect. According to several theories, profitable firms 
should have higher market value, because profitable firms tend to trade at a premium 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001). This is inconsistent with the mean values calculated 
in table 3; indicating that hedgers are less profitable than non-hedgers. This outcome 
can also be caused by reverse causation meaning that risk management is more 
valuable to less profitable firms. 
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5.4. Size  
Similarly, the explanatory variable SIZE gives mixed results. While the pooled and 
fixed for period regression imply that there is a positive relationship between size and 
firm value, the cross-section random effect specification indicates that size negatively 
influences firm value. This is supported by evidence from Land and Stultz (1994) who 
found a negative correlation between size and firm value. Size might impact firm 
value negatively because the bigger the firm, the harder it becomes to manage and 
control. As can be seen in table 3, hedgers have on average a lower firm size and are 
less profitable. But as already mentioned, this can be a sign of reverse causation.  
5.5. Diversified  
According to the pooled and fixed period models, diversity impacts firm value 
negatively, meaning that firms with more than 2 product segments have lower firm 
values than specialized firms that focuses on 2 or less products. Firms that operate in 
different fields might have a decentralized decision making for each product segment, 
which will make them harder to manage. This is also supported by the mean values 
implying that diversified firms have a lower Q (1.555), compared to non-diversified 
firms (1.8).  
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Table 2: OLS model of firm value 
 
Table 2 shows the results from the OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and 
defines firm value. The first model gives no significant results, where the dummy variable hedging, 
dividend and diversified has been excluded. The model is re-estimated adding back dividend; where 
profitability becomes significant, affecting firm value negatively. The model is re-estimated in a pooled 
OLS regression, where profitability, size, diversification and leverage are significant, but obtains a 
very low   , meaning that the independent variables only explain 12.6% of the dependent variable. The 
model is once again re-estimated where the period is fixed and includes all the independent variables. 
Once again the profitability, size, diversified and leverage variables are significant, with similar effects 
as the pooled regression. The random effects regression is once again estimated, where size, leverage 
and dividend are significant. I then chose to separate hedgers and non-hedgers and ran a separate 
regression for each of them. 
 
P-values are reported in (parenthesis) 
Results significant at the 5% level are donated with a star* 
Results significant at the 10% level are donated with two stars** 
 
  
 1. 
Fixed/Fixed 
2. 
Fixed/Fixed 
3. Pooled 4. Fixed 
period 
5. Random 
effects 
6. 
Hedgers 
FF 
7. Non-
hedgers 
FF 
Constant -0.188607 
(0.609) 
-0.407 
(0.326) 
 
0.5184 
(0.386) 
-0.058 
(0.518) 
1.951 
(0.000)* 
-0.359 
(0.374) 
0.361 
(0.666) 
Hedging   -0.040 
(0.30) 
0.029 
(0.348) 
N/A   
Capex 0.033 
(0.1165) 
0.029 
(0.144) 
0.0435 
(0.219) 
0.051 
(0.13) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
0.029 
(0.145) 
0.339 
(0.32) 
Profitability -0.287 
(0.244) 
-1.71 
(0.000)* 
0.63 
(0.041)* 
0.626 
(0.034)* 
-0.047 
(0.878) 
-1.694945 
(0.000)* 
0.262 
(0.46) 
Size 0.050 
(0.369) 
0.08 
0.197) 
0.03 
(0.0498)* 
0.042 
(0.001)* 
-0.262 
(0.000)* 
0.075 
(0.220) 
-0.029 
(0.817) 
Dividend  0.013 
(0.6) 
-0.015 
(0.643) 
-0.055 
(0.91) 
-0.053 
(0.059)** 
  
Diversified   -0.049 
(0.098)** 
-0.055 
(0.033)* 
N/A   
Leverage -0.0575 
(0.550) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
-0.595 
(0.00)* 
-0.54 
(0.00)* 
-0.337 
(0.004)* 
0.000272 
(0.998) 
-0.193 
(0.355) 
   0.84 0.866 0.126 0.22 0.746 0.866 0.8174 
 (F-stat) 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.745 1.82 0.713 0.597 1.824 1.824 1.61 
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5.6. Mean values of Tobin’s Q and its explanatory variables 
 
Table 3 shows that the average value for Tobin’s Q is higher for non-hedgers 
compared to hedgers. This means that we are checking for differences in firm value 
between hedgers and non-hedgers without considering the impact of other control 
variables. Both hedgers and non-hedgers have a Tobin’s Q larger than 1, which 
implies that they are trading at a premium. Considering that the sample period 
included the financial crisis of 2007-2008 is actually consistent with the fact that the 
Swedish economy managed to better survive and recover from the financial crisis 
compared to other economies. Excluding the control variables, we can based on this 
simple interpretation conclude that; non-hedgers have higher firm value than hedgers, 
which is inconsistent with theories stating that hedging impacts firm value positively 
(Clark and Mefteh, 2010; Allayannis and Weston, 2001).  
 
Similarly, the mean value of leverage for hedgers is almost the double compared to 
non-hedgers. The differences in size is not noteworthy, but we can see that non-
hedgers tend be larger than hedgers. However, when looking at profitability, non-
hedgers are significantly more profitable than hedgers. One interpretation of this is 
that less profitable firms chose to hedge their risks to protect their cash flows, while 
more profitable firms do not hedge as they have enough cash flows to cover potential 
losses incurred by foreign exchange volatility. 
 
Table 3: Mean values for hedger vs. non-hedgers 
 
 Tobin's Q Leverage Size Profit 
Hedgers 1.663 0.212 6.559 0.006 
Non-
hedgers 1.797 0.107 6.636 0.014 
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Table 4 shows the differences in dividend policies between hedgers and non-hedgers. 
It reveals that Tobin’s Q is the highest for hedgers who do not pay dividend, and 
lowest for hedgers who pays dividend. There are mixed empirical findings on how 
dividends impact firm value and are not further studied in this research. Additionally, 
as can be seen from table 5; diversified firms have on average a lower Tobin’s Q 
compared to firms are focused on two or less product segments.  
Table 4: Tobin’s Q mean values of dividend policies between hedgers vs. non-hedgers 
 
Tobin's Q No dividend Dividend 
Hedge 2,105 1,647 
No Hedge 1,744 1,862 
 
 
Table 5: Tobin’s Q mean value compared to diversified vs. non-diversified firms 
 
 Tobin's Q 
Diversified 1.56 
Not diversified 1.80 
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6. Conclusion  
This research studies the usage of currency derivatives and their impact on firm value 
in a sample of 85 firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2010. 
No clear evidence is found that hedging impacts firm value. The results are extremely 
mixed, which can be justified by several factors. First, we study firm value during a 
period that experienced a financial crisis. This was done purposely, as theories state 
that hedging reduces financial distress cost. If this theory holds, hedgers should have 
coped with the financial crisis better than non-hedgers. However, there are valid 
reasons to why hedging does not impact firm value, or why it even decreases it (Jin & 
Jorion, 2006; Hentschel and Kothari, 1997; Tufano, 1996). Second, this research 
makes the assumption that hedging has been used for the purpose of managing risk. 
As mentioned in previous sections, derivative usage can be among others, used for 
speculative reasons. This can increase exposure and lead to losses for a firm. The 
average value of profitability shows that hedgers are less profitable, which goes in 
line with this theory. Furthermore, we find that leverage has a negative influence on 
firm value. This research contributes with studying the hedging premium during crisis 
and on a national level. It shows that there is no relationship between FX derivative 
usage and firm value, even in time of crisis. It is evident that we are not able to draw a 
robust conclusion due to variations in the regression outputs. Clearly, this topic is 
subject to additional and deeper research. Future study should include more 
comprehensive data and take into account additional explanatory variables. Besides, it 
will be beneficial to test this relation using the most recent available figures. This will 
provide evidence of current market condition, because the impact of hedging might 
change through times. 
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8. Appendix  
 1. Fixed for cross-section and time-series  
 
Dependent Variable: TOBQ_LOG   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/15   Time: 11:24   
Sample: 2005 2010   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 85   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 510  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.188607 0.368220 -0.512212 0.6088 
LEVERAGE -0.057498 0.096041 -0.598676 0.5497 
CAPEX 0.033026 0.020997 1.572861 0.1165 
PROFIT -0.286623 0.245785 -1.166151 0.2442 
SIZE 0.050239 0.055878 0.899084 0.3691 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.839637    Mean dependent var 0.130871 
Adjusted R-squared 0.803786    S.D. dependent var 0.298448 
S.E. of regression 0.132200    Akaike info criterion -1.044093 
Sum squared resid 7.270417    Schwarz criterion -0.263632 
Log likelihood 360.2436    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.738101 
F-statistic 23.42053    Durbin-Watson stat 1.745131 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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 2. Pooled regression including all variables  
 
Dependent Variable: TOBQ_LOG   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/15   Time: 11:34   
Sample: 1 432    
Included observations: 432   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.104003 0.119952 0.867033 0.3864 
HEDGE -0.040631 0.039184 -1.036914 0.3004 
LEVERAGE -0.595278 0.092439 -6.439655 0.0000 
CAPEX 0.043527 0.035361 1.230936 0.2190 
PROFIT 0.629760 0.307797 2.046027 0.0414 
SIZE 0.032083 0.016307 1.967436 0.0498 
DIVIDEND -0.014765 0.031800 -0.464293 0.6427 
DIVER -0.049030 0.029595 -1.656686 0.0983 
     
     R-squared 0.126370    Mean dependent var 0.157973 
Adjusted R-squared 0.111947    S.D. dependent var 0.300460 
S.E. of regression 0.283143    Akaike info criterion 0.332618 
Sum squared resid 33.99214    Schwarz criterion 0.407959 
Log likelihood -63.84547    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.362362 
F-statistic 8.761606    Durbin-Watson stat 0.712871 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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 3. Fixed for time-series including all variables  
 
Dependent Variable: TOBQ_LOG   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/15   Time: 12:20   
Sample: 2005 2010   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 85   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 510  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.058275 0.090162 -0.646339 0.5184 
HEDGE 0.029058 0.030926 0.939606 0.3479 
LEVERAGE -0.541585 0.080453 -6.731669 0.0000 
CAPEX 0.050967 0.033654 1.514452 0.1305 
PROFIT 0.626304 0.294934 2.123538 0.0342 
SIZE 0.041996 0.012863 3.264921 0.0012 
DIVIDEND 0.003315 0.028483 0.116397 0.9074 
DIVER -0.054978 0.025674 -2.141419 0.0327 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.220301    Mean dependent var 0.130871 
Adjusted R-squared 0.201475    S.D. dependent var 0.298448 
S.E. of regression 0.266693    Akaike info criterion 0.219726 
Sum squared resid 35.34933    Schwarz criterion 0.327662 
Log likelihood -43.03020    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.262044 
F-statistic 11.70213    Durbin-Watson stat 0.596849 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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 4. Only included hedgers – Fixed for cross-section and time-series 
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOBQ_LOG   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/15   Time: 17:13   
Sample: 2005 2010   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 66   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 396  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.358635 0.403058 -0.889785 0.3742 
LEVERAGE 0.000272 0.107551 0.002525 0.9980 
CAPEX 0.028793 0.019714 1.460533 0.1451 
PROFIT -1.694945 0.411828 -4.115659 0.0000 
SIZE 0.074597 0.061165 1.219609 0.2235 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.865528    Mean dependent var 0.122550 
Adjusted R-squared 0.834528    S.D. dependent var 0.302364 
S.E. of regression 0.122996    Akaike info criterion -1.184508 
Sum squared resid 4.856130    Schwarz criterion -0.430452 
Log likelihood 309.5325    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.885774 
F-statistic 27.92041    Durbin-Watson stat 1.824009 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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 5. Includes only non-hedgers. Fixed for cross-section and time-series  
Dependent Variable: TOBQ_LOG   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/15   Time: 12:09   
Sample: 2005 2010   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 19   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 114  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.361151 0.834153 0.432955 0.6661 
LEVERAGE -0.192669 0.207130 -0.930187 0.3549 
CAPEX 0.339015 0.338585 1.001270 0.3195 
PROFIT 0.262288 0.353522 0.741929 0.4602 
SIZE -0.029194 0.126057 -0.231594 0.8174 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.782962    Mean dependent var 0.159776 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714822    S.D. dependent var 0.283811 
S.E. of regression 0.151561    Akaike info criterion -0.726285 
Sum squared resid 1.975473    Schwarz criterion -0.054237 
Log likelihood 69.39826    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.453538 
F-statistic 11.49053    Durbin-Watson stat 1.611079 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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 6. Cross-section random effects test equation  
 
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: TOBQ_LOG   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/15   Time: 16:14   
Sample: 2005 2010   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 85   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 510  
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.951119 0.386389 5.049617 0.0000 
HEDGE NA NA NA NA 
DIVIDEND -0.052817 0.027932 -1.890869 0.0593 
DIVER NA NA NA NA 
LEVERAGE -0.336977 0.116686 -2.887895 0.0041 
CAPEX 0.034943 0.026230 1.332174 0.1835 
PROFIT -0.046639 0.304752 -0.153040 0.8784 
SIZE -0.261930 0.058469 -4.479830 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.746019    Mean dependent var 0.130871 
Adjusted R-squared 0.692199    S.D. dependent var 0.298448 
S.E. of regression 0.165578    Akaike info criterion -0.599960 
Sum squared resid 11.51480    Schwarz criterion 0.147289 
Log likelihood 242.9897    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.306989 
F-statistic 13.86140    Durbin-Watson stat 1.740849 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
         
 
 
 
